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LIMITS ON JUSTICE: THE UNITED STATES’ 
FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE A RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL IN CIVIL LITIGATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If legal services were readily affordable and available, the vast majority of 
people would not go to court without the assistance of an attorney. Most 
people agree that in order to present and defend their rights effectively in 
court, they need an attorney—someone who is knowledgeable about both the 
law in general and possible claims and defenses unique to particular areas of 
the law.1 Attorneys are especially unlikely to go to court as a party to an 
action without separate legal representation, lest they become an example of 
the old axiom, “the lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client.”2  
Not every litigant, however, has a choice in the matter of obtaining 
counsel. Until 1963, the Supreme Court held that indigent criminal 
defendants had no constitutional right to counsel in most circumstances.3 
Moreover, although a recent national survey shows that nearly four out of 
five Americans mistakenly believe that the Constitution guarantees free 
lawyers to poor people in civil cases as well as criminal cases,4 civil litigants 
who cannot afford counsel await the day that rhetoric such as “equal justice 
for all” becomes a reality. 
Perhaps because “equal justice is at the essential core of the American 
system of government,”5 Americans find it difficult to believe that our legal 
system does not recognize a right as fundamental as the appointment of 
counsel to represent indigent litigants.6 However, the stark reality remains 
 1. See generally Roger C. Cramton, Promise and Reality in Legal Services, 61 CORNELL L. 
REV. 670 (1976). 
 2. Earl Johnson, Jr. & Elizabeth Schwartz, Beyond Payne: The Case for a Legally Enforceable 
Right to Representation in Civil Cases for Indigent California Litigants, 11 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 249, 
267 (1978).  
 3. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). For an in-depth discussion of Gideon, see infra 
notes 29-51 and accompanying text. 
 4. See ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, 1991-1992 DESK REFERENCE 
SUPPLEMENT: COMMEMORATING THE 200TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
(1991). Seventy-nine percent, almost four out of five Americans, hold this erroneous belief. 
 5. Earl Johnson, Jr., Toward Equal Justice: Where the United States Stands Two Decades Later, 
5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 199, 203 (1994) [hereinafter Johnson, Toward Equal Justice]. 
 6. Id. at 202-03. In fact, Johnson describes these facts as “uncomfortable truths,” which are 
difficult to “penetrate the public consciousness” because they are contrary to the beliefs that most 
Americans “hold dear.” Id. 
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that U.S. citizens face losing their homes and other property, their 
compensation, and even their children in court every day without the 
assistance of counsel, often when they have sought and requested such 
assistance. To those who grew up with pride in the promise of equality under 
the American judicial system, it might come as a shock to learn that virtually 
all other mature industrialized societies7 are far more progressive than the 
United States in their protection of the right to counsel for all members of 
society, regardless of income.8 One begins to wonder why the United States, 
usually a leader in democracy and justice, places such arbitrary limits on 
justice afforded to its citizens. 
This Note examines how and why the United States should follow the 
lead of these other countries and recognize a right to counsel for civil 
litigants. Part II discusses the evolution of a right to counsel in this country, 
as well as in other mature industrialized countries, with a specific emphasis 
on England, Germany, and Switzerland as models.9 Part III explores the 
benefits of a right to counsel in civil litigation and the policy behind its 
adoption in the three “model” countries. Part IV discusses which of the three 
models would best suit the United States. 
II. EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
ELSEWHERE 
A. The Right to Counsel in the United States 
1. History of the Right to Counsel in Criminal Proceedings 
An examination of the history behind the right to counsel for criminal 
defendants is essential to understanding why the Supreme Court has refused 
to extend that same right to indigent civil litigants.10 Despite the 
unambiguous language in the Sixth Amendment, which states “[i]n all 
 7. The term “industrialized societies” refers to societies in which half of the overall energy 
output relies on inanimate energy machines (as opposed to reliance on man or animal to provide 
energy). Mature industrialized societies, sometimes called “post-industrialized,” are also distinguished 
in that they no longer rely on farming or manufacturing as the basis of industry. Rather, industry in 
post-industrialized societies is based on “tertiary industry,” which includes economic sectors such as 
finance and services. See generally GERHARDT LENSKI ET AL., HUMAN SOCIETIES: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO MACRO SOCIOLOGY (8th ed. McGraw Hill) (1999). 
 8. Johnson, Toward Equal Justice, supra note 5, at 203. See also infra Part II.B. 
 9. England, Germany, and Switzerland are all considered mature industrialized societies. See 
LENSKI, supra note 7, at 78. 
 10. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981). See also infra notes 64-101 and 
accompanying text. 
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criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defence,”11 up until the 1930s, only people 
charged with crimes punishable by death had the right to counsel.12 During 
the 1930s, however, the Supreme Court greatly expanded the understanding 
of one’s rights under the Sixth Amendment. For example, in the 1938 case 
Johnson v. Zerbst,13 the Court held that all federal defendants must be 
provided an attorney under the Sixth Amendment.14 Furthermore, in Powell 
v. Alabama,15 the Court found the right to counsel so fundamental that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause required states to provide 
counsel for all defendants charged with capital crimes.16  
In Powell v. Alabama, the state charged nine young illiterate black men 
with the rape of two white girls on a freight train passing through Tennessee 
and Alabama.17 Although the trial judge appointed all the members of the 
local bar to defend the young men, no attorney appeared at trial to do so.18 At 
the last minute, a local lawyer defended the men “with reluctance,” and the 
men were convicted.19  
The Supreme Court agreed with the defendants’ subsequent challenge of 
those convictions on the basis that they were effectively denied the aid of 
counsel because they did not have the opportunity to consult with their 
lawyer in order to prepare a defense.20 The Court’s rationale in Powell, later 
referred to as the “guiding hand” principle, became the underpinning for the 
landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright:21 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did 
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent 
and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science 
of law. If charged with a crime, he is incapable, generally, of 
determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is 
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel 
he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 12. JOAN BISKUPIC & ELDER WITT, THE SUPREME COURT AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 207 (3d ed. 
1997) 
 13. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
 14. BISKUPIC & WITT, supra note 12, at 207. 
 15. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 16. Id. at 73. 
 17. Id. at 49. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 71. 
 21. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), discussed infra at notes 29-51 and 
accompanying text.  
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incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise 
inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge to prepare his 
defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding 
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without 
it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because 
he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of 
men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and 
illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.22 
The Supreme Court did not, however, immediately extend the right to 
counsel to defendants charged with non-capital crimes. Rather, in the 1942 
case of Betts v. Brady,23 the Supreme Court came to the opposite conclusion, 
holding that for non-capital cases in state courts the appointment of counsel 
for indigent defendants did not constitute a fundamental right of due process 
guaranteed under the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments.24 A divided Court25 
held that states must provide a lawyer to the accused only if “a denial of 
fundamental fairness” would occur without one.26 Thus, the Court opted for a 
case-by-case approach that later cases further refined.27 Eventually, to prove 
denial of fundamental fairness, defendants had to show that they were 
victims of “special circumstances,” such as their illiteracy, ignorance, youth, 
or mental illness, the complexity of the charge against [them] or the conduct 
of the prosecutor or judge at the trial.”28 
However, in 1963 the Supreme Court overruled Betts in a substantially 
similar case, Gideon v. Wainwright.29 The State of Florida charged Clarence 
Earl Gideon, a fifty-one-year-old white man,30 with the felony of breaking 
 
 
 22. 287 U.S. at 68-69. Justice Sutherland’s justification for a right to counsel came to be known 
as the “guiding hand” principle. BISKUPIC & WITT, supra note 12, at 207. 
 23. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
 24. Id. at 461-62.  
 25. The Court was divided six to three, with Justices Douglas and Murphy concurring with 
Justice Black’s dissent. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
 26. Id. at 462. The critical excerpt reads:  
Asserted denial [of due process law] is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given 
case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the 
universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, fall 
short of such denial. In the application of such a concept, there is always the danger of falling into 
the habit of formulating the guarantee into a set of hard and fast rules, the application of which in a 
given case may be to ignore the qualifying factors therein disclosed.”  
Id.; see also ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 8 (1964). 
 27. LEWIS, supra note 26, at 8. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Supreme Court stated that Betts’ case was “strikingly like the facts 
upon which Gideon here bases his federal constitutional claim.” Id. at 338. 
 30. LEWIS, supra note 26, at 5. 
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and entering a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor.31 Unable to 
obtain an attorney because of lack of funds, Gideon thus appeared in court 
without one.32 When he requested that the court appoint an attorney, he was 
informed that under the laws of the State of Florida “the only time the Court 
can appoint counsel to represent a defendant is when that person is charged 
with a capital offense.”33 Although Gideon insisted that he was entitled to 
counsel according to the United States Supreme Court, the court again denied 
his request.34 Thus, Gideon proceeded to trial defending himself.35  
Despite the fact that “Gideon conducted his defense about as well as 
 31. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 336. 
 32. Id. at 337. 
 33. Id. The trial transcript provides a telling account of Gideon’s situation:  
The Court: What says the State, are you ready to go to trial in this case? 
Mr. Harris (William E. Harris, Assistant State Attorney): The State is ready, your Honor. 
The Court: What says the Defendant? Are you ready to go to trial? 
The Defendant: I am not ready, your Honor. 
The Court: Did you plead not guilty to this charge by reason of insanity? 
The Defendant: No sir. 
The Court: Why aren’t you ready? 
The Defendant: I have no counsel. 
The Court: Why do you not have counsel? Did you not know that your case was set for trial 
today? 
The Defendant: Yes sir, I knew that it was set for trial today. 
The Court: Why, then, did you not secure counsel and be prepared to go to trial? 
The Defendant answered the Court’s question, but spoke in such low tones that it was not audible. 
The Court: Come closer up, Mr. Gideon, I can’t understand you, I don’t know what you said, and 
the Reporter didn’t understand you either. 
At this point, the Defendant arose from his chair where he was seated at the Counsel Table and 
walked up and stood directly in front of the Bench, facing his Honor, Judge McCrary. 
The Court: Now tell us what you said again, so we can understand you, please. 
The Defendant: Your Honor, I said: I request this Court to appoint counsel to represent me in this 
trial. 
The Court: Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but I cannot appoint counsel to represent you in this case. 
Under the laws of the State of Florida, the only time the Court can appoint counsel to represent a 
Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense. I am sorry, but I will have to deny 
your request to appoint counsel to defend you in this case. 
The Defendant: The United States Supreme Court says I am entitled to be represented by counsel. 
The Court: Let the record show that the defendant has asked the court to appoint counsel to 
represent him in this trial and the court denied the request and informed the defendant that the only 
time the court could appoint counsel to represent a defendant was in cases where the defendant 
was charged with a capital offense. The defendant stated to the court that the United States 
Supreme Court said he was entitled to it.  
LEWIS, supra note 26, at 9-10. 
 34. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337.  
 35. Id. at 337-38. 
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could be expected from a layman,”36 the jury found him guilty and sentenced 
him to five years in the state prison.37 Gideon filed a habeas corpus petition38 
with the Florida Supreme Court on the grounds that the trial court improperly 
refused him counsel and thus denied him of his rights “as ‘guaranteed by the 
Constitution and Bill of Rights by the United States Government.’”39 The 
Florida Supreme Court, without an opinion, denied all relief.40 Gideon then 
petitioned for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court on the 
same grounds.41  
Despite the fact that it had decided Betts only twenty years prior,42 the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.43 The Court explained its reasoning for 
granting certiorari in Gideon’s case: “the problem of a defendant’s federal 
constitutional right to counsel in a state court has been a continuing source of 
controversy and litigation in both state and federal courts.”44 Pursuant to 
custom,45 the Supreme Court appointed an attorney to represent Gideon 
before the Court.46 Moreover, the Court, by special leave, permitted J. Lee 
Rankin, of the American Civil Liberties Union, and George D. Mentz, for the 
state of Alabama, to argue the issue as amicus curiae.47 
Two months after oral arguments, Justice Black, speaking for the Court, 
stated that the decision in Betts was an “abrupt break” with previous, well-
considered precedents, such as Powell v. Alabama.48 The Court quoted in full 
Justice Sutherland’s “guiding hand” reasoning in Powell,49 and held that 
 36. Id. at 337. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Gideon proceeded in forma pauperis, handwriting in pencil one copy of his petition. LEWIS, 
supra note 26, at 4-5. 
 39. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337. 
 40. Id. 
 41. LEWIS, supra note 26, at 3-5. 
 42. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
 43. Gideon v. Wainwright, 370 U.S. 908 (1962). 
 44. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 338. 
 45. LEWIS, supra note 26, at 44-45. The Supreme Court’s “unvarying practice” is to provide a 
lawyer for any prisoner whose petition has been granted and who cannot afford her own attorney. Id. at 
44. A formal written request for an attorney must be made by the prisoner, which Gideon completed: 
“I do desire the Court to appoint a competent attorney to represent me in this Court. Because I do not 
know the procedure nor do I have the ability to do so." Id. at 46. 
 46. LEWIS, supra note 26, at 48. The Court appointed then-Washington attorney, Abe Fortas, to 
represent Gideon. Fortas, at the time, worked for the high-powered firm Arnold, Fortas and Porter, 
which he founded. Id. at 48, 49. President Johnson would later appoint Fortas to serve as a Justice on 
the United States Supreme Court in 1965. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW lxxxii 
(3rd ed. 1996). 
 47. LEWIS, supra note 26, at 174-80. Rankin argued on behalf of overruling Betts and providing 
a right to counsel for state criminal defendants, while Mentz argued to let the precedent stand. Id. 
 48. Id. at 344; see also supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 49. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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precedent as well as “reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our 
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too 
poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided 
for him.”50 Thus, the Court held that the right to counsel for indigent criminal 
defendants is a constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment, which 
extends to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and, furthermore, 
that Betts v. Brady was overruled.51  
The Court did not, however, discuss the scope of its decision. The Court 
did not mention what kinds of criminal cases outside of felonies, if any, the 
decision covered, nor at what stage of the proceeding counsel was required.52 
Thus, future cases determined these issues as they arose.53 For example, 
Argersinger v. Hamlin54 held that assistance of counsel was required even for 
a misdemeanor offense punishable by imprisonment for less than six 
months.55 Later, in a line of cases beginning with Miranda v. Arizona,56 the 
Court held that even certain suspects of a crime have the right to counsel—
and must be notified of that right—before the police may begin 
questioning.57 
2. Expansion of the Right to Counsel to Civil Litigants 
Subsequent cases revealed that the right to counsel was not “tethered 
solely” to the Sixth Amendment,58 and thus not limited to purely criminal 
proceedings. In In re Gault,59 the Supreme Court held that the Due Process 
 50. Id. at 344. The court went on to state: “This seems to us to be an obvious truth.” Id. 
 51. Id. at 345. 
 52. LEWIS, supra note 26, at 189. Neither did the Court discuss whether the decision applied to 
people already in prison, so those who had not had counsel would be entitled to a new trial. See also 
generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 53. LEWIS, supra note 26, at 189. 
 54. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
 55. Id. at 37. 
 56. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 57. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (holding that counsel should be appointed to 
protect an indigent defendant during a line-up, the Court developed the “critical stage” test to 
determine when counsel is constitutionally required to protect defendant’s rights); Coleman v. 
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (holding that a preliminary hearing was a critical stage requiring the 
appointment of counsel to indigent defendants); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (holding that 
critical stages can also include post-trial proceedings). But see Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) 
(holding generally that advisory proceedings must be formally initiated against a suspect to initiate a 
critical stage); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (holding that a photographic identification of 
a suspect did not constitute a critical stage).  
 58. Robert W. Sweet, Civil Gideon and Confidence in a Just Society, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
503, 505 (1998). 
 59. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). This case involved delinquency proceedings against a minor who engaged 
in “lewd or indecent remarks” over the telephone. Id. at 4. The child and his parents could not afford 
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires appointment of counsel to 
represent a child whose family cannot afford counsel in state delinquency 
proceedings “which may result in commitment to an institution in which the 
juvenile’s freedom is curtailed.”60 The Court supported its holding with the 
now familiar “guiding hand” reasoning cited first in Powell then in Gideon,61 
stating that a juvenile requires the skilled assistance of an attorney for the 
same reasons as an adult.62 Because juvenile delinquency hearings are styled 
as civil and not criminal proceedings,63 the Gault decision appeared to open 
the door for the Court to expand the Fourteenth Amendment due process 
right to counsel to civil litigants who could not provide their own.  
Yet in 1981, when the Supreme Court faced this issue in Lassiter v. 
Department of Social Services,64 it refused to make such an expansion. In 
Lassiter, the Durham County Department of Social Services sought to 
terminate the parental rights of Abby Gail Lassiter with respect to her son, 
William. The Department alleged Lassiter had no recent contact with 
William and that she had “willfully left the child in foster care for more than 
two consecutive years.”65 During this two-year period, however, Lassiter 
served a prison sentence for an unrelated charge.66 Lassiter’s incarceration 
rendered the Department’s allegation of “willfulness” questionable at best.67 
When the Department notified Lassiter of their petition to terminate her 
parental rights, she strongly objected, recommending instead that William’s 
grandmother care for him until Lassiter’s release.68 Lassiter also informed 
her prison guards of the petition and her objections. However, they did 
nothing to assist her in obtaining counsel.69  
Therefore, Lassiter proceeded to the termination hearing without 
counsel, and he was committed to a detention home for seven years. Id. at 7-8. The Court imposed this 
sentence despite the fact that a corresponding adult punishment for a criminal charge of “Lewd Phone 
Calls” would be a fine of $5 to $50 and imprisonment of not more than two months. Id. at 8-9. 
 60. Id. at 41. 
 61. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Sweet, supra note 58, at 505. 
 64. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
 65. Id. at 21-22. 
 66. Id. at 20.  
 67. Id. at 52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). At trial, the court admitted evidence about the unrelated 
charge. Such evidence may have constituted impermissible character evidence that an attorney for 
Lassiter, if present, could have: (1) excluded through proper objections; and/or (2) limited to what was 
absolutely necessary; or (3) created a record of objections in order to preserve them for appellate 
review. Because Lassiter was untrained in the law and she did not have an attorney, none of these 
tactics were advanced. 
 68. Id. at 52-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
 69. Id. at 52-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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counsel.70 The Department’s main witness was a social worker who testified 
regarding events prior to her assignment to the case,71 as well as hearsay 
testimony about the grandmother’s inability to care for another child.72 
Unfamiliar with the rules of evidence and North Carolina law, Lassiter 
“failed to uncover this weakness in the worker’s testimony.”73  
The court proceeded to tell Lassiter that she could cross-examine the 
social worker.74 However, Lassiter began to make declarative statements, 
unaware that in performing a cross-examination she was limited to asking 
questions of the witnesses.75 Her subsequent attempts to cross-examine the 
 70. Id. at 22. 
 71. Id. at 53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 54. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 75. Id. Lassiter clearly did not understand the function of cross-examination, and the limited 
guidance she received from the judge did not clarify her understanding: 
THE COURT: All right. Do you want to ask her any questions? 
[MS. LASSITER]: About what? About what she— 
THE COURT: About this child. 
[MS. LASSITER]: Oh, yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. 
[MS. LASSITER]: The only thing I know is that when you say— 
THE COURT: I don’t want you to testify. 
[MS. LASSITER]: Okay. 
THE COURT: I want you to know whether you want to cross-examine her or ask any questions. 
[MS. LASSITER]: Yes, I want to. Well, you know, the only thing I know about is my part that I 
know about it. I know— 
THE COURT: I am not talking about what you know. I want to know if you want to ask her any 
questions or not. 
[MS. LASSITER]: About that? 
THE COURT: Yes. Do you understand the nature of this proceeding? 
[MS. LASSITER]: Yes. 
THE COURT: And that is to terminate any rights you have to the child and place it for adoption, if 
necessary. 
[MS. LASSITER]: Yes, I know. 
THE COURT: Are there any questions you want to ask her about what she has testified to? 
[MS. LASSITER]: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. 
{MS. LASSITER]: I want to know why you think that you are going to turn my child over to a 
foster home? He knows my mother and he knows all of us. He knows her and he knows all of us. 
THE COURT: Who is he? 
[MS. LASSITER]: My son, William. 
[SOCIAL WORKER]: Ms. Lassiter, your son has been in foster care since May of 1975 and since 
that time— 
[MS. LASSITER]: Yeah, yeah and I didn’t know anything about it either.  
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witness led to noticeable impatience on the part of the judge.76 Moreover, 
disparaging comments by opposing counsel during the course of Lassiter’s 
attempted cross-examination remained unchecked by the court.77 
Furthermore, Lassiter effectively “lost her right to present testimony on 
direct examinations.”78 This loss occurred because, in the absence of counsel, 
the Judge, rather than an advocate for Lassiter, questioned both Lassiter and 
her mother.79 An independent advocate could have elicited information while 
acting in a manner consistent with Lassiter’s best interests, thus preserving 
the neutrality of the judiciary and the adversarial system of justice. The court 
further compromised its neutrality—as well as Lassiter’s case—by 
questioning Lassiter and her mother as if they were adverse witnesses.80 
When Lassiter testified, the judge expressed “open disbelief” at one of her 
answers.81 When the judge finished questioning Lassiter, he stated “[a]ll right 
Mr. Odom, see what you can do.”82 The court engaged in additional 
disparaging remarks83 when Lassiter’s mother testified.84 At the close of the 
Id. at 54 n.22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 76. See, e.g., id.  
 77. For example: 
[MS. LASSITER]: . . . Why you want to place him in adoption among strange people that not his 
family and they not got no relationship to him and his family is over here, my mother and I.  
[OPPOSING COUNSEL]: I think she has already answered that question. I think it’s obvious, you 
know, I think the answer to that question is very obvious. 
Hearing Tr. at 22-23, In re Lassiter, 259 S.E.2d 336 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (No. 79-6423). Lassiter, as 
an indigent defendant without counsel, stood in stark contrast to the State, which was represented by 
counsel and which possessed far greater resources than did Lassiter. Lassiter’s case illustrates this kind 
of “double disparity” that many indigent litigants face—the party with no attorney and no resources to 
call on must go up against the party who has both an attorney (or attorneys) and a wealth of resources. 
In Lassiter’s case, she suffered from both disparities while fighting for an especially compelling 
interest, the right to keep her son.  
 78. Petitioner’s Brief at 45, Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (No. 79-6423). 
 79. Id.  
 80. Petitioner’s Brief at 44, Lassiter (No. 79-6423). See also Hearing Tr. at 23-36, 43-52, In re 
Lassiter, 259 S.E.2d 336 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (No. 79-6423). 
 81. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 55 n.23. Justice Blackmun refers to this section of the transcript in his 
dissent: 
[THE COURT]: Did you know that your mother filed a complaint on the 8th day of May, 1975, 
alleging that you had often left the children with her for days without providing money and food 
while you were gone? 
A: No, ‘cause she said she didn’t file no complaint. 
[THE COURT]: That was some ghost who came up here and filed it I suppose.  
Hearing Tr. at 30, In re Lassiter (No. 79-6423); see also Lassiter, 453 U.S. at 55 n.23. 
 82. Hearing Tr. at 36, In re Lassiter (No. 79-6423). 
 83. For example, while the elder Ms. Lassiter was testifying on “direct,” the court interrupted and 
stated “I tell you what, let’s just stop all this. You question her, please. Just answer his questions. 
We’ll be here all day at this rate. I mean we are just wasting time, we’re skipping from one subject to 
another.” Hearing Tr. at 52, In re Lassiter (No. 79-6423). During her cross-examination, the elder Ms. 
Lassiter vehemently denied stating that she complained about her daughter’s ability to take care of her 
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hearing, the court terminated Lassiter’s parental rights.85 
Lassiter appealed the court’s decision on the ground that as an indigent, 
she was entitled to an attorney under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.86 The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the 
Constitution did not mandate a right to counsel in a termination of parental 
rights proceeding.87 Although the Supreme Court of North Carolina denied 
review,88 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the 
question.89 
In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that in state proceedings to terminate 
parental rights, trial courts must evaluate requests for appointed counsel on a 
case-by-case basis using the due process analysis described in Matthews v. 
Eldridge.90 Under this analysis, courts evaluate three factors to determine 
what due process requires in each case: (1) the litigant’s private interests at 
stake; (2) the government’s interest; and (3) the risk that the procedures used 
will lead to erroneous decisions.91 In Lassiter, the Court stated that a 
children. The court reacted as follows: 
[OPPOSING COUNSEL]: Did you tell Ms. Mangum on the 8th day of May, 1975, that when 
your daughter was in the hospital having William that she left the children in a cold house with no 
heat? 
A: No, sir, no sir, unh unh, no sir. 
 MS. LASSITER: That’s a lie. 
A: No, sir, no, sir. God knows, I’ll raise my right hand to God and die saying that. Somebody else 
told that. 
THE COURT: I wish you wouldn’t talk like that it scares me to be in the same room with 
you. 
Hearing Tr. at 55, In re Lassiter (No. 79-6423). 
 84. Lassiter’s mother, Lucille, the grandmother of William and caretaker of Lassiter’s four other 
children. Hearing Tr. at 52, In re Lassiter (No. 79-6423). 
 85. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 23-24. 
 86. Id. at 24. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id.  
 89. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 449 U.S. 819 (1980). The Court also granted leave to the 
following organizations to file briefs as amicus curiae: Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar 
Association, Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (No. 79-6423) (writing in favor of 
right to counsel in parental rights termination proceedings); Brief of Amici Curiae National Center on 
Women and Family Law, Inc. et al., Lassiter (No. 79-6423) (writing in favor of right to counsel in 
parental rights termination proceedings); Brief of Amici Curiae National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association, Lassiter (No. 79-6423) (writing in favor of right to counsel in parental rights termination 
proceedings); Brief of Amicus Curiae State of North Carolina, joined by the Attorney General of 
Delaware et al., Lassiter (No. 79-6423) (writing in opposition to granting a right to counsel in parental 
rights termination proceedings); and Brief of Amicus Curiae North Carolina Civil Liberties Union, 
Lassiter (No. 79-6423) (writing in favor of right to counsel in parental rights termination proceedings). 
 90. 452 U.S. at 27. See also Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (detailing the due 
process test). 
 91. 452 U.S. at 27. 
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rebuttable presumption exists that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed 
counsel “only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical 
liberty.”92 Stated another way, unless loss of the case may result in 
incarceration or some other form of deprived physical liberty, the court 
presumes appointment of counsel is unnecessary for indigent parties. In order 
to determine whether the circumstances of the Lassiter case rebutted this 
presumption, the Court then employed the Matthews analysis.93 Despite the 
admittedly high interest a parent has in retaining parental rights for her 
children,94 and the arguably high possibility for error absent legal 
representation, the Court found that these factors did not rebut the 
presumption that right to counsel is not ordinarily provided in parental rights 
termination proceedings.95  
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, 
dissented, arguing that due process requires the appointment of counsel in 
parental rights termination proceedings.96 The dissent pointed out that the 
type of “ad-hoc approach” adopted by the majority was “thoroughly 
discredited nearly 20 years [prior] in Gideon v. Wainwright.”97 Furthermore, 
the dissent argued that the majority applied the right analysis, but came to an 
illogical conclusion.98 Under the Matthews factors, the dissent found the 
interest of a parent to be a unique and special one that clearly outweighed the 
weak pecuniary interests of the state.99 Moreover, the dissent determined that 
the absence of counsel created an extraordinarily high possibility of 
 92. Id. at 26-27. 
 93. Id. at 27. 
 94. The Court stated that “the parent’s interest is an extremely important one” that may, in some 
circumstances, be tainted by “criminal liability inherent in some termination proceedings.” Id. at 31. 
Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion addressed the fact that Lassiter’s separate criminal proceeding 
also seemed to play a part in the majority’s decision. Justice Blackmun noted that, although confined 
to the issue of appointment of counsel, the majority recited details of Lassiter’s second degree murder 
conviction set forth in an unpublished opinion. Id. at 57 n.26 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice 
Blackmun stated: “reliance on such evidence is likely to encourage the kind of subjective value 
judgments that an adversarial judicial proceeding is meant to avoid.” Id. at 58. For a discussion of 
impermissible character evidence allowed at the trial level in the absence of counsel, see supra notes 
71-73 and accompanying text. 
 95. Id. at 31. The Court also admitted the government’s interests were “relatively weak.” Id. 
 96. Id. at 35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 48-49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 99. Id. at 48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The state’s interest to save money is weak in comparison 
with Lassiter’s interest in keeping her parental rights. Id. The third Matthews factor, the likelihood of 
an erroneous decision resulting from the procedures used, also weighed in favor of Lassiter. Id. at 44. 
The dissent questioned why these factors did not outweigh the state’s interest in saving money and 
thereby rebut the presumption that counsel is not ordinarily provided, especially considering that the 
majority conceded that the state’s interest was weak. Id. at 49. One possible answer is the Court’s 
reluctance to grant any positive rights. For a discussion of this inquiry, see infra note 195. 
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erroneous decisions.100 Lastly, the dissent discussed the greater cost and 
judicial inefficiency involved in the ad-hoc approach the majority had 
adopted.101 
3. Extra-Legal Attempts to Provide Counsel 
Despite the Supreme Court’s refusal to expand the reasoning of cases like 
Powell or Gault to “find” a constitutional due process guarantee of counsel in 
civil litigation, other forces in American society have recognized such a need 
and have attempted to provide redress. Right to counsel promoters recognize 
that low-income Americans face a wide range of legal problems including: 
Social Security, housing, consumer matters, insurance, welfare benefits, 
family crises, grinding financial problems, bankruptcies, repossessions, 
unemployment compensation, and many more.102 A recent American Bar 
Association study reported that forty percent of low-income households 
surveyed had civil legal problems in the last twelve months but could not 
obtain counsel.103 In the early nineties, “two of five Americans surveyed 
could not afford legal help with everyday legal problems like contracts, 
housing, or domestic relations.”104  
These staggering unmet legal needs exist despite the systems put in place 
to address them.105 Currently, the three highest contributors to legal services 
funding are direct pro bono services, federal funding through the Legal 
Services Corporation (“LSC”), and Income on Lawyer’s Trust Accounts 
(“IOLTA”) programs.106 The LSC,107 however, has suffered a serious decline 
 100. Id. at 50-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 101. Id. at 51. 
 102. Cramton, supra note 1, at 673. 
 103. Patricia M. Wald, Becoming a Player: A Credo for Young Lawyers in the 1990s, 51 MD. L. 
REV. 422, 428 (1992). 
 104. Id. 
 105. The American Bar Association (ABA) states: “The need for legal services by the eligible 
client community is far greater than the resources available to meet that need.” STANDARDS FOR 
PROGRAMS PROVIDING CIVIL PRO BONO LEGAL SERVICES TO PERSONS OF LIMITED MEANS 139 
(1996). The ABA urges legal aid programs to develop standardized priorities to determine which 
applicants will receive help. Id. at 139-140. This proposal is akin to the “triage” method in the medical 
profession, except that unlike in medicine, the legal profession will still turn away a large number of 
needy applicants due to lack of resources to serve them. Moreover, it is important to note that the 
public is commonly left out of the drafting of these standards and is effectively left out of the overall 
debate regarding right to counsel in general. See Peter A. Joy, What We Talk About When We Talk 
About Professionalism: A Review of Lawyer’s Ideals/Lawyer’s Practices: Transformations in the 
American Legal Profession, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 987, 1004 (1994). 
 106. Talbot D’Alemberte, Tributaries of Justice: The Search for Full Access, FLA. B.J., Apr. 
1999, at 12, 25. A study on sources of legal services in 1997 listed the LSC as contributing $12.6 
million, IOLTA $12.3 million, and direct pro bono as $130 million. Id. As a solution to the problem of 
unmet legal needs, D’Alemberte proposes a state model that combines and improves existing and new 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p317 note Ritchey.doc  7/17/01   5:15 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
330 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 79:317 
 
 
 
 
 
in revenue generation since its inception. 
Direct lawyer pro bono service “remains a vital component of any plan 
for legal access.”108 Nonetheless, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
merely contain an aspirational rule that addresses support for legal services 
for persons with limited means.109 Although some states have strengthened 
their oversight of pro bono activities, these efforts have failed to yield 
uniformity in participation or higher participation rates and have instead 
sparked intense debate and hostility within the legal community.110  
The LSC provides a central site from which it distributes federal funds to 
legal aid clinics across the nation.111 Efforts vary greatly from state to state, 
however, and different states have different standards for distributing aid.112 
The reporting requirements also vary greatly, which impedes a general 
understanding of how much is actually accomplished.113 Furthermore, the 
programs. Id. passim. D’Alemberte lists eight “tributaries” or sources of legal services. Id. at 14-15. In 
addition to increased federal funding for LSC, see id. at 14; higher interest rates for IOLTA programs, 
see id. at 16; and comprehensive lawyer pro bono plans that have mandatory reporting requirements, 
see id. at 19-20; D’Alemberte’s model contains the following sources: the addition of a surcharge of 
$10 that would be assessed on state filing fees, see id. at 18; a “Civil Gideon Fund” developed by a 
sales tax on legal services, as well as by revenue generated from punitive damages awards and 
unclaimed class action awards, see id. at 19; a fee-shifting statute for low-income litigants “who must 
challenge government agencies to establish entitlement,” see id.; and local plans for access to justice 
that are narrowly tailored to fulfill community needs, see id. at 25.  
 However, even if a state used each source D’Alemberte suggests, lack of uniformity among states 
would remain a significant obstacle to assuring equal access to the justice system for America’s low-
income population. Until a uniform federal system is in place, however, innovative suggestions like 
D’Alemberte’s play an increasingly important role in assuring current unmet legal needs addressed. 
Moreover, if the Supreme Court or Congress developed a constitutional or statutory right to counsel 
for low-income civil litigants, D’Alemberte’s model could be adopted in full or part on a federal level. 
Funding and services would then be uniform throughout the United States without rendering current 
efforts to solve the problem obsolete. 
 107. See generally LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR (Douglas J. Besharov ed., 1990). 
 108. D’Alemberte, supra note 106, at 19. 
 109. Model Rule 6.1, “Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service,” suggests each lawyer render 50 
hours of pro bono publico legal services per year as well as contribute financial support to 
organizations that provide such services to persons of limited means. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 6.1 (1998). Although the Model Code has no direct counterpart to Model Rule 6.1, 
Ethical Consideration 2-25 of the Model Code states that providing legal services to those who are 
unable to afford them is a responsibility that rests upon each individual lawyer. MODEL CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (1998). 
 110. D’Alemberte, supra note 106, at 24. Some states have unsuccessfully moved toward 
mandatory pro bono requirements, while others have merely sought to require mandatory reporting of 
pro bono services—also unsuccessfully. Id. 
 111. Created through the Legal Services Corporations Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-2996 L (1994). For 
general information regarding the LSC and its current services, see http://www.lsc.gov.  
 112. American Bar Association, supra note 105, at 139-40.  
 
 113. D’Alemberte, supra note 106, at 19-23. D’Alemberte notes that a mandatory reporting 
system also greatly increases lawyer participation in pro bono programs, despite the fact that the 
participation itself is purely voluntary. Id. For examples of mandatory and voluntary state reporting 
systems, see generally id. (citing LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION APPROPRIATION HISTORY 2 (1997); 
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LSC has met substantial government hostility in recent years.114  
All fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have 
adopted the creative legal services funding program called IOLTA.115 This 
program was based on a Florida Supreme Court justice’s “observation of a 
similar program in British Columbia.”116 In short, the program uses interest 
from short- or long-term trust accounts, created by lawyers with client 
payments, to fund legal services.117 Previously, the interest created profit for 
the banks because lawyers are ethically prohibited from receiving any benefit 
from the trust accounts.118 Currently, IOLTA programs have become a 
significant source of funding for public service projects, particularly for legal 
services to the poor.119  
Again, however, the states’ versions of the IOLTA programs lack 
uniformity. For example, some states’ programs are voluntary.120 Thus, there 
are large discrepancies in how much revenue the programs generate from 
state to state.121  
B. The Right to Counsel Outside of the United States 
1. In General 
Countries such as England,122 France,123 Germany,124 Norway,125 
In re Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 573 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1990); FLA. BAR & THE FLA. BAR 
FOUND., THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON PRO BONO SERVICES' REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
FLORIDA (1998); HAW. STATE BAR ASS’N, ATTORNEY REGISTRATION STATEMENT 3 (1997); STATE 
BAR OF TEX., PRO BONO REPORTING: JUNE 1996 THROUGH MAY 1997 (1998)). 
 114. Wald, supra note 103, at 428. See also D’Alemberte, supra note 106, at 14-16 (discussing the 
12 percent drop in Congressional funding for LSC in 1995 from its highest funding in 1981); cf. 
LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR: TIME FOR REFORM (Douglas J. Besharov ed., 1990) (discussing the 
lawyer dominated nature of the LSC and related inability to focus on true needs of the poor). 
 115. Arthur J. England & Russell E. Carlisle, History of Interest on Trust Accounts Program, 56 
FLA. B.J. 101 (1982). 
 116. D’Alemberte, supra note 106, at 16. 
 117. Id. at 16-17. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Earl Johnson, Jr., The Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: An International Perspective, 19 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 341, 342 (1985) [hereinafter Johnson, An International Perspective]. For a detailed 
discussion of England’s right to counsel, see infra notes 141-48 and accompanying text. 
 123. Johnson, An International Perspective, supra note 122, at 343. 
 124. Id. at 343-44. For a detailed discussion of Germany’s right to counsel appears, see infra notes 
149-58 and accompanying text. 
 125. Id. at 344. Norway’s right to counsel for indigent civil litigants was created in 1915 by 
statute. Id.  
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Sweden,126 Denmark,127 Belgium,128 Netherlands,129 Austria,130 Spain,131 
Italy,132 Portugal,133 Switzerland,134 New Zealand,135 the Australian States,136 
and Canada137 furnish counsel for those who cannot afford their own in civil 
litigation. This right to counsel in civil litigation for the poor originated in 
these countries through statute, through their respective constitutions, or 
through both.138 In fact, “the United States is the only major Western nation 
that does not provide a right to counsel in civil matters.”139  
Furthermore, the European Convention of Human Rights guarantees the 
right to counsel in civil cases, recognizing it as a fundamental human right.140 
The United States’ position on this issue becomes even more difficult to 
 126. Id. Sweden created its right to counsel for indigent civil litigants in 1919 by statute. Id. The 
statute mandated that appointed lawyers receive government compensation. Id. 
 127. Id. at 344-45. Denmark’s right to counsel was also established by statutory authority and is 
extended to some members of the middle class as well as the poor. Id. 
 128. Id. Belgium created the right to counsel for poor civil litigants as part of its Code of Civil 
Procedure, and appointed attorneys remain uncompensated for their services. Id. 
 129. Id. at 345. The Netherlands enacted a legal aid system in 1957 that uses a compensated 
private counsel model. Id. 
 130. Id. at 346. Since 1895, Austria has provided a right to counsel for indigent civil litigants 
whose cases appear to show some merit. Id. Austria’s Legal Aid Act, passed in 1973, improved the 
“process of demonstrating indigency.” Id. 
 131. Id. Spain enacted a statutory right to counsel for indigent civil litigants in 1855 as part of its 
Law of Spanish Civil Procedure. Id. In 1975, the Spanish government began to provide compensation 
for attorneys appointed to represent indigent litigants. Id. 
 132. Id. Italy’s right to counsel for indigent civil litigants is both statutory and constitutional in 
nature. Id. The duty to provide legal services to the poor originated with “the birth of th[e] nation” in 
1865 and was further refined by a legal aid law passed in 1923. Id. 
 133. Id. Portugal enacted a statutory right to counsel in civil cases in 1899. Id. Extensive 
amendments to the statute occurred in both 1944 and 1970. Id. 
 134. Id. See also Francis William O’Brien, Why Not Appointed Counsel in Civil Cases? The Swiss 
Approach, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 passim (1967). For a detailed discussion of Switzerland’s right to 
counsel appears see infra notes 159-68 and accompanying text. 
 135. See Johnson, An International Perspective, supra note 122, at 347. New Zealand’s Legal Aid 
Act of 1969 created an entitlement to representation for low-income civil litigants by private counsel. 
Id. 
 136. Id. at 347-48. Although legal aid in Australia is administered through individual states rather 
than on a federal scheme, “as a practical matter any poor person receive[s] legal assistance if he or she 
ha[s]” reasonable grounds for involvement in litigation. Id. at 348 n.30. Most states began legal 
assistance programs in the 1960s and 1970s. Id. 
 137. Id. at 348. Canada has a “province by province” arrangement for legal assistance that began 
in 1966. Id. By 1979, all but two provinces had enacted comprehensive legal aid programs in civil 
cases. Id. 
 138. See id.; see also supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text. For a detailed analysis of the 
legal aid programs provided across the globe, see MAURO CAPELLETTI ET AL., TOWARD EQUAL 
JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL AID IN MODERN SOCIETIES (1975) and PERSPECTIVES ON 
LEGAL AID (F. Zemans ed., 1974). 
 139. See Johnson, An International Perspective, supra note 122, at 352-353.  
 140. Airey v. Ireland, 1979 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.) 420, 422 
(summary of result).  
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understand in light of the fact that our system of justice is based on the 
English system, where a legally enforceable right to counsel was 
incorporated into the common law by statute over 500 years ago.141 The 
English, German and Swiss models provide useful points of comparison with 
the American approach. 
2. England, Germany, and Switzerland 
England, a post-industrialized society,142 has had a comprehensive legal 
services program linked to a statutory right to counsel for indigent English 
litigants since 1495.143 Thus, England serves as “the statutory model” for 
consideration in the United States. Today, English legal aid legislation, 
passed in the latter half of the twentieth century,144 comprises an extremely 
thorough system of legal services, including representation for civil and 
criminal cases, as well as a broad range of transactional services.145 The 
philosophy of the program is “to ensure that no one needing the protection of 
an English Court should be denied this for lack of means and that the courts 
can fulfil their function of administering the law effectively, through the 
parties coming before them on equal terms, irrespective of their financial 
resources.”146  
Under the present-day English system, lawyers are fully compensated out 
 141. Johnson, An International Perspective, supra note 122, at 342. 
 142. See supra note 7 for a definition of this term. 
 143. Johnson, Toward Equal Justice, supra note 5, at 204. The English Parliament enacted this 
statute during the reign of Henry VII. Id. Translated into current vernacular, this law stated: 
And after the said writ or writs be returned . . . the justices shall assign to the same poor person or 
persons counsel learned by their discretions which shall give counsels nothing taking for the same, 
and in likewise the same justices shall appoint an attorney and attorneys for the same poor persons 
. . . which shall do their duties without any rewards.  
Johnson, An International Perspective, supra note 122, at 342 (citing a statute of Henry VII). 
 144. This legislation included: The Legal Aid and Advice Act passed in 1949 (which was the 
precipitating legislation for the current scheme); the Legal Aid Act of 1960 (increasing financial 
limits); the Legal Aid Act of 1964 (providing costs to successful opponents paid from the Legal Aid 
Fund); and the Legal Aid and Assistance Act of 1972 (which “corrects a serious imbalance in the 
Scheme”). Seton Pollock, The English Legal Aid System, in TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL AID IN MODERN SOCIETIES 343, 344 (Vincenzo Varano ed., 1975). 
 145. Id. at 343. Transactional matters covered under the system include: “the perusal or drawing 
of documents, tenancy agreements, wills, transfers of real property, documents for effecting a change 
of name, and, indeed, any service which an English solicitor provides for those able to pay for them.” 
Id. 
 146. Id. Although this objective has not yet been fully realized, there have been substantial strides 
toward achieving it in recent years. Id. Pollock also notes that although the general population regards 
legal aid legislation as part of the welfare programs in England, lawyers themselves regard it as “as . . . 
[a] major step in the acceptance by the State of its responsibility to ensure that justice is available to 
the people.” Id. at 344. 
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of government funds for the services they provide.147 England also provides 
services to members of the population who are well above the poverty 
level,148 which illustrates the system’s belief that other factors, such as 
expenses, childcare costs, and the like indicate the necessity of legal need, in 
addition to income. 
Germany’s statutory right to counsel in civil cases was incorporated into 
the German Code of Civil Procedure in 1877.149 Moreover, the German 
Constitutional Court has reinforced and supplemented the statutory right to 
counsel for the poor by declaring the right to counsel a constitutional 
guarantee of a fair hearing in civil cases.150 The right to counsel is a 
constitutional guarantee, even where the legal aid statute does not so 
require.151 Thus, Germany represents “the constitutional plus statutory 
model” for consideration by the United States. 
Since 1923, the German State has compensated for legal services 
provided by private attorneys.152 Like in England, there are no full-time, 
salaried legal aid attorneys.153 Rather, private attorneys supply all of the 
services for the poor.154 Attorneys are not permitted to refuse appointment to 
represent indigent clients.155 Two benefits arise from having only private 
attorneys available for legal aid cases. First, low-income litigants can “select 
their lawyer from a large group of” practitioners.156 Second, clients can visit 
their attorneys at private offices, a process devoid of any stigmatization.157 
 147. Id. at 348; see also Russell Wallman, Legal Service in England, in LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE 
POOR 194-97 (1990) (discussing the history of salaried legal services in England). 
 148. See D’Alemberte, supra note 106, at 26 n.3. 
 149. Karl August Klauser & Robert A. Riegert, Legal Assistance in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, 20 BUFF. L. REV. 583, 585 (1971). 
 150. Johnson, Toward Equal Justice, supra note 5, at 206.  
 151. Id.  
 152. See Klauser & Riegert, supra note 149, at 591 n.45. The lawyers’ fees are fixed by the state. 
Id.  
 153. Id. at 591.  
 154. Id. at 591-92. Klauser and Reigert observed that “more than half of the German attorneys 
accept at least some legal aid cases regularly.” Id. at 591. However, they note that no statistics are 
available to track exact numbers. Id. 
 155. Id. at 590-91. However, in Mallard v. U.S. District Court, 490 U.S. 296 (1989), the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that an attorney was able to refuse appointment to such a case under the statute. 
Id. at 309. However, the Court in Mallard left undecided the question whether an attorney could refuse 
a court’s appointment to a case when the court was operating under its “inherent powers” to appoint 
rather than under the statute. Id. at 310. 
 156. See Klauser & Riegert, supra note 149, at 601. 
 
 157. Id. This includes stigmatization suffered by the client, who would otherwise be known as 
indigent by partaking in legal services set aside for the poor, and stigmatization of legal services 
attorneys, who are sometimes regarded as not as competent as higher paid private attorneys. Id. Thus, 
low-income litigants are not made to feel as if they are “beneficiaries of an act of charity,” and are 
more likely to bring their causes to justice. Id. In systems in which low-income litigants are 
stigmatized or feel as if they are receiving charity, they may be less likely to bring valid claims at all. 
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Germany’s legal aid programs have also had remarkable success in their 
cost-effectiveness.158 
The highest Swiss court159 established Switzerland’s constitutional right 
to counsel in civil litigation in the 1937 case Schefer gegen Appenzell A. Rh. 
Regierunsgrat.160 In this case, a poor person asked the Swiss court to rule on 
the question of whether indigent Swiss citizens have a right to appointed 
counsel under the Swiss Constitution in civil cases.161 The court had to 
interpret Article Four of the Swiss Constitution, which contains a guarantee 
that “[a]ll Swiss are equal before the Law,” similar to the Equal Protection 
Clause in the United States Constitution.162 
The court held that for citizens to be equal under the law, as guaranteed 
by Article Four of the constitution, indigent litigants must be appointed 
counsel in civil cases.163 The court reasoned: 
[t]he principle of [equality] before the law does not impose upon the 
cantons the obligation to provide a lawyer except in those cases, 
where, lacking one, a party could not normally assert his rights in 
proceedings. Thus free judicial assistance ought to be granted liberally 
in a civil matter where the handling of the trial demands knowledge of 
the law . . . .164  
The court distinguished civil cases from criminal cases, where there is 
typically no right to counsel in Switzerland, stating that while criminal cases 
move along a structured path, administered by the government, civil actions 
can move along only by the will of the parties involved.165 Therefore, a 
potential litigant unfamiliar with the rules of civil procedure such as 
jurisdiction or venue, which are “frequently complicated,” might easily fail 
merely to bring the action out of ignorance or intimidation of the law.166 
After this landmark case, the Swiss created a legal aid system in which 
In order to prevent the creation of unwarranted incentives to litigate, Klauser and Reigart suggest plans 
that emphasize and create incentives for the attorneys who reach settlement. Id. at 606. 
 158. Id. at 603. 
 159. The Federal Court of Switzerland is the highest Swiss court. 
 160. Judgment of Oct. 8, 1937, BGE 63 I 209 (Switz.). See also O’Brien, supra note 134, at 5 
(where this case is partially translated and discussed). 
 161. O’Brien, supra note 134, at 5.  
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. Criminal cases in Switzerland, however, are a different story. Criminal defendants are not 
provided counsel for numerous reasons including the active participation and differing responsibilities 
of Swiss judges in the trial. Id. 
 164. Id. (translating the Swiss Court’s decision). “Cantons” are a loosely based system of states 
that make up the Swiss Confederation. Id. at 2 n.2. 
 165. Id. at 7. 
 166. Id. 
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“lawyer’s fees, witnesses’ expenses, funds for inspections of property 
involved in the suit, and funds for the hiring of specialists” are provided for 
indigent litigants.167 Lawyers are appointed through a rotation system and 
service is mandated.168 
III. THE IRRECONCILABLE DOCTRINES OF GIDEON AND LASSITER 
In Lassiter, the United States Supreme Court established a presumption 
that counsel is not ordinarily provided in civil cases in which a loss of 
physical liberty is not at stake.169 To justify the appointment of counsel, a 
civil litigant must satisfy the Matthews analysis—show that the litigant’s 
private interests and the risk of error outweigh the government’s interest—to 
rebut the presumption that counsel is not ordinarily provided.170 As illustrated 
by Lassiter, the interest in keeping one’s child plus the extraordinarily high 
risk of error in a hearing conducted without counsel did not outweigh the 
government’s pecuniary interest in not appointing counsel in that parental 
rights termination proceeding.171 Thus, even under the most compelling 
circumstances, indigent defendants will find it virtually impossible to rebut 
the presumption against appointing counsel. Yet the loss of physical liberty 
for one day, or merely the perceived threat of loss of liberty, mandates the 
appointment of counsel for those who cannot otherwise afford it.172  
In more ways than one, these two analyses are simply irreconcilable. 
First, the reasoning behind adoption of a right to counsel for indigent 
criminal defendants mirrors that of the reasoning behind adoption of such a 
right for low-income civil litigants. Second, civil litigants are arguably at a 
greater disadvantage without counsel than are criminal defendants without 
counsel. Third, discrepancies in actual fundamental fairness aside, the 
appearance of fundamental fairness is also essential to the preservation of our 
system of justice.173 Finally, right to counsel for the poor is a recognized 
fundamental human right,174 and it should be given such weight in the United 
States. 
In the United States, the rationale behind adopting a right to counsel for 
 167. Id. at 8. Exact provisions vary from canton to canton. Id. at 9. 
 168. Id. at 8-9. 
 169. For a discussion of the Court’s opinion in Lassiter, see supra notes 64-101 and 
accompanying text.  
 170. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981).  
 171. See supra notes 64-101 and accompanying text.  
 172. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text. 
 173. See infra notes 182-85 and accompanying text 
 174. See supra notes 122-41 and accompanying text. 
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criminal defendants and civil litigants is essentially the same. The reasons the 
Supreme Court espoused in Powell for providing counsel to criminal 
defendants do not change for civil litigants. Civil litigants are also typically 
unequipped for what is essential to a fair trial—namely, knowledge of the 
law. This knowledge includes mastery of the rules of evidence, so that 
inadmissible evidence such as hearsay, or testimony pertaining to settlement 
negotiations, will not be admitted to the detriment of the civil litigant. This 
essential knowledge also increases awareness of possible affirmative 
defenses, which would shift the burden of proof or mandate dismissal of the 
case entirely. Untrained civil litigants also lack specialized knowledge of 
statutory or common law causes of action, relief, or exemptions from suit. 
Civil litigants are typically ignorant of the law because they lack training, 
experience, and licensing. They also are not privy to the same resources and 
networking opportunities that are available to members of the Bar. For 
example, imagine the amount of time it would take an unfamiliar eye to 
understand a statute compared to a lawyer who, because of education, 
training, experience, or aid from other attorneys, could interpret it more 
swiftly.175 It defies reason to require civil litigants to educate themselves 
about the law in time to file or respond to a complaint, all the while 
maintaining their “day” jobs, when attorneys are not permitted to file or 
defend suit for a client until completion of at least four years of 
undergraduate education, three years of legal education, and becoming 
successfully licensed in the state by applying to the bar and passing the 
state’s bar exam. 
Neutrality and impartiality of the judiciary is also compromised when 
attorneys do not represent civil litigants. When a litigant is without counsel, 
an undue and unethical176 responsibility rests on judges to take the place of 
counsel.177 Judges are forced to play dual roles in order to compensate for the 
absent attorney.178 The Lassiter case aptly illustrates the need for judges to 
 175. For example, suppose a civil litigant needed to know the law in Missouri on divorce and 
child custody. To the trained eye, this does not seem like such an incredible feat. However, most first-
day law students—people who have completed at least a bachelor’s degree and the law school entrance 
exam—would not know where to begin such a search. Assuming our civil litigant could even find the 
appropriate provisions, entitled “Chapter 452: Dissolution of Marriage, Divorce, Alimony and 
Separate Maintenance,” she faces well over 125 sections of the statute with titles like “Child support, 
how allocated—factors to be considered—abatement or termination of support, when—support after 
age eighteen, when—public policy of state—payments may be made directly to child, when—child 
support guidelines, rebuttable presumption, use of guidelines, when—retroactivity—obligation 
terminated, how.” MO. REV. ST. § 452.340 (1999) 
 176. Cramton, supra note 1, at 677 
 177. Id. 
 
 178. For an example of the difficult role of judges in this situation, see supra notes 78-83 and 
accompanying text.  
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remain impartial in our adversarial system.179  
Moreover, there are indications that some civil litigants are at a greater 
disadvantage for not having counsel than certain criminal defendants. 
“Imposition of unrealistic alimony or child support requirements, loss of 
custody of children, civil commitment as an incompetent, and eviction” are 
consequences that can far outweigh short periods of deprivation of physical 
liberty.180 Empirical studies illustrate that a lawyer’s assistance in a civil case 
often makes the difference between success and failure.181  
Furthermore, the burden of proof in most civil cases, “a preponderance of 
the evidence,” is a much easier standard than the “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” standard in the typical criminal case. Because “beyond the reasonable 
doubt” requires more of the prosecution than a civil litigant’s burden of 
proof, it may have the effect of providing the criminal defendant with more 
protections than the civil litigant. This discrepency becomes especially 
poignant in the case where the unrepresented civil litigant faces an opposing 
party who has counsel, as the state of North Carolina did in the Lassiter case. 
Lastly, actual occurrences of unfairness aside, the appearance of 
impropriety and lack of uniform application of the law can damage our 
system of justice. Some commentators argue that in an era when confidence 
in the justice system in general is waning,182 we simply cannot endure further 
“erosion of faith in the judicial system.”183 This may particularly be the case 
in light of the stratification of economic classes in the United States—often 
with disparate impact on minorities.184 The unwillingness of the United 
States to acknowledge the right to counsel as a fundamental human right, no 
matter where its legal origins, also calls into question the United States’ 
commitment to human rights, both domestically and internationally.185 
 179. Id. at 677. 
 180. Id. at 676. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See Joy, supra note 105, at 1009 n.123 (discussing the indirect voice of the public’s opinion 
as heard through opinion polls and the “proliferation of lawyer jokes”). 
 183. Sweet, supra note 58, at 506. 
 184. See generally Jennifer M. Russell, The Race/Class Conundrum and the Pursuit of 
Individualism in the Making of Social Policy, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1353 (1995); Brian Mikulak, Classism 
and Equal Opportunity: A Proposal for Affirmative Action Based on Social Class, 33 HOW. L.J. 113 
(1990); Patricia Hill Collins, African American Women and Economic Justice: A Preliminary Analysis 
of Wealth, Family, and African-American Social Class, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 825 (1997); Thomas D. 
Barton, Legal Anthropology and Economic Analysis, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 476 (1985) (reviewing 
KATHERINE NEWMAN, LAW & ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 
PREINDUSTRIALIZED SOCIETIES (1983) and RICHARD POSNER, A THEORY OF PRIMITIVE SOCIETY, IN 
THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981)). 
 185. See Johnson, An International Perspective, supra note 122, at 352-53. The European 
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms requires that fair and 
public hearing be provided in civil matters within a reasonable time and by an impartial tribunal. Id. at 
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IV. RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CIVIL LITIGATION AS GUARANTEED BY THE 
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
The rule espoused in Lassiter is untenable. The Court’s application of the 
Matthews due process analysis to rebut a “no counsel” presumption led to an 
erroneous decision in Lassiter. If even the private interest of retaining one’s 
child, combined with an extremely high chance of error, cannot overcome a 
presumption that counsel is not ordinarily provided,186 what will? The dissent 
in Lassiter would keep this balancing test, but would arrive at the opposite 
result.187 However, if judicial discretion can result in such discrepancies, 
perhaps the ad-hoc approach applied in Lassiter should be put to rest. 
The United States should consider the right to counsel as it exists in other 
post-industrialized countries. Because many of these countries have 
guaranteed such a right for hundreds of years,188 the United States has the 
benefit of learning lessons from their long toil, and can pick and choose the 
most viable options for its own application here.  
Despite the fact that the Equal Protection Clause in the United States 
Constitution189 contains language similar to its Swiss190 and German191 
counterparts, the United States has not recognized a right to counsel in civil 
cases when European nations have already done so.192 Although some 
commentators have suggested an addition to the Seventh Amendment to 
explicitly include the right to counsel for those unable to obtain it 
otherwise,193 the simplest solution would be for the Court to overrule 
Lassiter,194 as Gideon overruled Betts, and hold that our Constitution 
guarantees a due process right to counsel for indigent civil litigants.195 
352. The European Court of Human Rights, the body that officially interprets the convention, has held 
that this requirement means that member states must either supply free lawyers or create a system of 
justice in which lawyers are not necessary. Id. at 353-54. See also supra note 140 and accompanying 
text (discussing Airey v. Ireland).  
 186. Lassiter v. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981).  
 187. Id. at 57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
 188. See supra Part II.B.2.  
 189. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 190. See supra text accompanying note 162.  
 191. See supra text accompanying notes 149-51. 
 192. Johnson, Toward Equal Justice, supra note 5, at 206. 
 193. See, e.g., CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, A U.S. CONSTITUTION FOR THE YEAR 2000 (1995). 
 194. As was recommended by Justice Sweet, supra note 58, at 506. 
 195. The largest barrier to establishing a right to counsel is the current Court’s insistence that the 
constitution provides for negative rights and not positive rights. Many scholars, however, have 
criticized this unbending practice as not only inadequate, but simply false. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, 
Due Process, Government Inaction, and Private Wrongs, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 53; Cass R. Sunstein, 
Neutrality in Constitutional Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1992). In many cases, the Constitution does 
create positive rights: “The contracts clause protects a ‘positive’ right—the right to available courts, to 
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In working toward providing this expanded right to counsel, the model 
from which the United States can learn the most is the German 
“constitutional plus statutory” model. Whereas the English system was based 
purely on a statutory right,196 and the Swiss system on equal protection 
grounds in the Swiss constitution,197 the German system is based on a 
constitutional guarantee of a fair hearing.198 The Code of Civil Procedure 
provides the statutory right in Germany.199 Because an American 
constitutional right to counsel in civil litigation most likely lies within due 
process analysis rather than equal protection,200 Germany’s system provides 
the most similar model. Moreover, a statutory right alone in the United States 
circumscribes the fundamental nature of the right. 
Thoughtful federal statutory provisions, however, would be necessary to 
implement any due process right to counsel in civil cases. Here, the United 
States can learn much about the implementation and expansion of the basic 
right to counsel from England’s statutory model, which takes into account 
many factors beyond mere poverty.201 Without immediate federal statutory 
aid, the present difficulties in lack of uniformity and application202 would still 
exist. 
The Legislature could simply enlarge and enhance existing programs in 
an effort to provide a uniform system of services. Germany’s reliance solely 
on private practice attorneys may be unrealistic in the United States, though 
some component of the system could be similar in order to provide the 
benefits enjoyed by such a system, such as lack of client stigma and more 
uniform services. Perhaps the one benefit of being one of the last countries to 
recognize a right to counsel in civil cases for indigent people is that the 
United States may pick and choose methods from the many existing 
international programs to create a system that expands the opportunities for 
justice.203 
enforce contractual agreements. The eminent domain clause protects a ‘positive’ right—the right to 
governmental help to protect private property from invasions by others, including private persons.” 
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 977 (3d ed. 1996). 
 196. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.  
 197. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.  
 198. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.  
 199. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.  
 200. The Court’s refusal to establish the poor as a suspect class effectively eliminates many equal 
protection challenges. 
 201. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.  
 202. See supra Part II.A.3.  
 203. One strong attraction to such a system is the lack of stigma a client experiences, because he 
or she simply meets a private lawyer like any other citizen with legal business. Klauser & Riegert, 
supra note 149, at 603. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
Justice Black stated that he thought he would not live to see Betts v. 
Brady overruled.204 Little did he know that some twenty years after it was 
decided, he would write the opinion of Gideon and open the door for 
American ideology to come closer to living up to what it promises. It is now 
some twenty years since the Lassiter decision, which effectively foreclosed a 
guaranteed right to counsel for civil litigants. Now is the time to fulfill the 
promise of equal justice that began with the rhetoric of the Constitution and 
became a glimmer of reality in Gideon. Many other countries have proven 
that effective legal aid can be provided in a cost-effective manner. The 
United States lags behind as the only major post-industrialized country that 
has not provided a right to counsel for its indigent citizens. Now is the time 
for the United States to stop placing limits on justice and catch up. 
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 204. LEWIS, supra note 26, at 192.  
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